For over 5.1 million Syrians who have sought refuge abroad—many of whom have been displaced for more than a decade—the potential fall of the Assad regime represents a pivotal moment. It brings within reach the long-cherished aspiration of returning to a liberated Syria. This development also sparks hope within the international humanitarian community, which has struggled to witness resolutions to displacement crises in recent years.
However, some host countries accommodating large Syrian populations view this regime change as an opportunity. Since the onset of the Syrian civil war in 2011, several nations have regarded the continued presence of refugees as a political burden. For instance, Prime Minister Najib Mikati of Lebanon—where Syrian refugees constitute one-third of the population—has urged Syrians to return, citing the pressure on national resources. Similarly, Austria, home to 100,000 Syrians, the second-highest number in Europe after Germany, has proposed a “return bonus” for those who go back and is formulating plans to repatriate individuals with criminal records.
Yet, the aspirations of both the Syrians and their host countries must be grounded in the current realities: Syria remains unstable, with large areas devastated by conflict and unable to support a sudden influx of returnees. For many displaced Syrians, the situation in Syria is too unpredictable to ascertain when a safe return might be possible, let alone desirable. Compounding this uncertainty is the question of control over various regions in Syria, alongside severe housing shortages, infrastructure deficits, and limited job opportunities—particularly in agriculture, construction, and industry. Although there is a noticeable increase in Syrian trips back home to celebrate and assess conditions post-Assad, many of these visits are likely temporary. The on-the-ground realities are unlikely to stabilize sufficiently in the near future for any permanent repatriation to be feasible. Each Syrian’s decision about returning will depend on their personal experiences and evaluations of the potential benefits.
Moreover, host nations may find it challenging to incentivize Syrians to leave. Many have lived in Europe long enough to gain long-term residency or citizenship, allowing them to remain without needing to maintain refugee status. As of December 2023, approximately 180,000 Syrians held long-term residency in EU countries, with over 300,000 obtaining EU citizenship since 2013. However, there are still over 780,000 Syrians in the EU who retain either refugee status or subsidiary protection. For those whose refugee status stems from a fear of persecution by the Assad regime, EU law may allow governments to decline renewing that status or consider revocation.
Guardrails for Return
European governments will likely face practical hurdles when attempting to repatriate Syrians. Each individual’s status must be assessed carefully to avoid refoulement, which requires time and evaluation of their situations. Furthermore, a change in status does not guarantee return—voluntary or otherwise. Conflicts and other forms of persecution within Syria may prevent returns, meaning those who lose refugee status might still be eligible for subsidiary protection or another form of legal status. Family unity protections under the European Convention on Human Rights could also complicate removals, particularly for families with mixed statuses.
The situation for Syrians in neighboring countries is even more precarious. The roughly 4.5 million Syrians residing in Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan often lack secure legal status; those with refugee status face the risk of revocation based on political decisions. Notably, Turkey and Lebanon have previously engaged in forced returns and may be more inclined to do so in a post-Assad context.
Competing Incentives
However, host countries must consider their own interests when contemplating refugee returns. After years of displacement, many Syrians have integrated into their new communities. For example, nearly two-thirds of employed Syrians in Germany work in critical sectors such as healthcare, transportation, logistics, or food production—fields already experiencing significant labor shortages.
Pushing for large-scale returns to a post-conflict environment also risks destabilizing whatever governance emerges in Syria, particularly when neighboring countries and European governments are keen to reduce tensions and prevent further conflict in the region. Therefore, a rapid push for return may not serve any party’s interests.
Building a Win-Win Situation for Syrians and Host Countries
While the ultimate decisions about Syria’s future lie with its people, the international community—including the primary host countries—has a crucial role in fostering a safe and viable Syria that accommodates the repatriation of those wishing to return. In the realm of migration policy, this involves striking a balance between the desire of Syrians to remain and their wish to return.
First, host countries must acknowledge that Syrian departures are likely to be a long-term process. Historical precedents show that it can take years for refugees to return after conflicts; for instance, it took nearly a decade for half of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 2 million displaced individuals to return home after the Balkan conflict. Recent guidance from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) emphasizes that Syria is not yet safe for repatriation, advising that returns should only occur once security and humanitarian challenges are adequately addressed. Governments need to be realistic about the time it will take to reach that point.
Host nations also need to assure Syrians that their legal status will remain stable in the short term. While it may be sensible to suspend asylum adjudications until Syrian conditions are updated—something already underway in Europe—vague announcements about potential reevaluation of refugee status can cause unnecessary concern. This may lead refugees to withdraw from society or relocate to countries where they perceive less risk of repatriation. If status reviews are planned, it is essential to clearly communicate the implications for those who might lose status, the timelines for reviews, and criteria for enforced returns, when applicable. International guidelines can help define what information should be shared with potential returnees. Moreover, politicians should refrain from making unrealistic promises—if courts are likely to halt deportations to Syria, for instance, policymakers should not suggest otherwise.
When returns are feasible, it is crucial that host countries facilitate a sustainable reintegration process. This might include allowing returnees to make preparatory visits to Syria to assess security conditions, secure housing, or seek employment. Currently, some nations revoke refugee status for individuals returning home—even briefly—claiming this undermines their claim of fear. Instead, countries should explore options for limited circularity, permitting Syrians to travel back and forth as they prepare for return, acknowledging that such visits may reinforce the perception that Syria remains unsafe. Offering this flexibility, or expedited access to permanent residency, would enable Syrians to maintain socioeconomic ties to their host countries while facilitating the flow of funds and knowledge back to Syria.
Sustainable return is further aided by robust reintegration support. Donor nations should consider extending this assistance to both Syrians they host and those in neighboring countries. This support can include direct cash grants and community initiatives aimed at boosting livelihoods for both returnees and local residents. Looking ahead, broader capacity-building for Syrian institutions to help reintegrate returnees into national systems and social services—such as one-stop shops that coordinate support—could be beneficial. However, such assistance must be substantial and ongoing; a one-time payment of 1,000 euros as a “return bonus” is unlikely to sufficiently support reintegration.
Finally, for return to be sustainable, host countries need to invest in the stability of Syria by increasing development assistance to both Syria and its neighbors, as the European Union has begun to do. Syria requires significant infrastructure, governance, and public service support, contingent on the new government demonstrating a commitment to fair and inclusive governance, facilitating the stabilization necessary for successful returns and reintegration. Neighboring countries will also need continued assistance to accommodate the Syrian populations that may choose to remain due to safety concerns or reluctance to return. Additionally, countries like Turkey and Jordan may serve as temporary hubs for Syrians displaced from other locations before they enter Syria, warranting donor support for these transitional populations.
The timeline for when Syria will become a safe and desirable destination for voluntary repatriation is uncertain. The most favorable scenario involves an inclusive, stable, democratically elected government in Syria. However, host countries must also prepare for less optimistic outcomes that may preclude involuntary returns. By planning for these various potential futures, host nations can better support Syrians wishing to return while ensuring protections and safety nets are in place should that goal remain elusive.
Source: migrationpolicy.org
